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1. Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument
Metaphysical realism is, as described by Putnam, 'a bundle of intimately
associated philosophical ideas about truth' (1988, p. 107). Its assumptions
are threefold. Firstly, there is a unique correspondence relation between
the propositions of language and features of the external world. Secondly,
there is One True Theory of this external world or mind-independent
reality. And thirdly, there is a commitment to bivalence, such that each
proposition of language must be either true or false.
Putnam employs these assumptions of the metaphysical realist within
a model-theoretic or permutation argument (see Figure 1). Central to this
argument is a language which has been formalised. This language
contains a range of predicates which differ in their number of argument
places. In this way, the language may contain monadic predicates, such
as x is fat; dyadic predicates, such as x is the father of y; and triadic
predicates, such as x is between y and z. This argument also employs a
set of possible worlds. This set contains the actual world which differs
from other possible worlds in that it is realised. Next, there is the set of
possible individuals. U, represents all the individuals in the possible world
Wj , and equally, U, represents all the individuals in the possible world
Wj • Finally, we have extension, such that R jj is the extension of the
predicate F, in the possible world Wj • Equally, Ruj is the extension of the
predicate F, in the possible world Wj . Three terms are closely related in
this context. The first term is extension, the set of things that a predicate
refers to in a single possible world. Next is the intension of a predicate.















































(I) <Uj;R iJ(i = 1,2, "', k) 'Intended model of the language in Wj relative to interpretation!'
(2) Pj (R uJ) '):Ruj PERMUTATION
(3) <Uj: Pj (R ij) (i = 1,2, ,.. , k) > INTERPRETATION J
(4) Pj(Rij) '):Rij PERMUTATION
(6) <Uj; Rij (i = 1,2, .." k)
ISOMORPHIC








































According to van Fraassen, within a use conception of language we do
not understand language by obtaining an interpretation of language (and
Putnam's model-theoretic argument is flawed for its assumption of just
this point); rather, language understanding proceeds by means of
pragmatic tautologies. As examples of pragmatic tautologies, the reader
is asked to consider the following sentences:
"cat" denotes cats.
"Paul is a cat" is true if and only if Paul is a cat.
... the first and second sentences are paradigmatic examples of
pragmatic tautologies in my language. They are undeniable by me,
exactly because I acknowledge "cat" to be a word in my language ...If
our language had developed differently in a certain way then "cat"
would have denoted gnats, rats or bats. Under such circumstances,
uses of "cat" would not have been acts referring to cats, and "Paul is
a cat" would have been used to state that Paul is (not a cat but) a gnat,
rat, or bat. Pragmatic tautologies (for me) are sentences of my own
language which state something that could indeed be (or could have
been) false but which I cannot coherently deny (1997, p. 35).
In relation to the problem of reference, then, van Fraassen claims that
these pragmatic tautologies are central to an explanation of why there is
no problem of which we can speak. His argument can be summarised as
follows. Being able to explain the problem of reference requires that we
show why the predicates of our language have the extensions that they do
have, and not some deviant set of extensions, and this in turn requires
that we be able to state the conditions under which our extensions are the
correct ones. While the demand to establish such conditions has the form
of an intelligible demand, it actually constitutes a type of 'pseudo
problem', according to van Fraassen:
Now, what is the worry when we worry that this word ["green"] might
not have the right extension? The only answer I can come up with here
is:
The worry that there are lots of green things out there which
aren't in the extension of "green" and/or things that are not green
yet are in that extension.
But what sense do I make if I say to myself:
There are green things which are not in the extension of "green".








































rejecting metaphysical realism, Putnam is, in effect, rejecting the
conception of language that is motivated by metaphysical realism. What
is more, in Putnam's more recent writings, particularly in his attacks on
an interface conception of perception and conception (writing, as he is,
in 1997, van Fraassen should be aware of these attacks), Putnam is
effectively challenging the view of language which says that language
consists in an interpretation and a separately identifiable syntax. It thus
emerges that van Fraassen and Putnam are both equally opposed to the
same conception of language and that their views on the upshot of the
model-theoretic argument converge rather than, as van Fraassen is
claiming, diverge.
2. A Pragmatic Conception of Argument
It is clear that for Putnam and van Fraassen metaphysical realism contains
an unintelligible demand to explain the referential relation which our
language does in fact have with the world. It is also clear that for these
theorists our only way through this unintelligibility is to reject a
conception of language that posits a separate syntax and interpretation and
to institute in the place of this conception a pragmatic view of language
in which the roles of user and use assume analytical significance. In
recent years, there has been a proliferation of pragmatic models of both
argument and fallacy. Notwithstanding this proliferation, many fallacy
theorists either habitually express reservations about the analytical merits
of these models or proceed to employ them in a way that suggests that
they are perceived by these theorists to be inferior to strictly logical
models of argument. In the next section, I relate fallacy theorists'
scepticism about the analytical merits of pragmatic models of argument
and fallacy to a certain metaphysical urge on the part of these theorists.
This urge, I contend, compels fallacy theorists to inflate the standards that
they bring to the task of fallacy evaluation with the result that many non-
fallacious or rationally acceptable arguments are judged to be fallacious.
I argue that this inflation results from the fallacy theorist's assumption of
a metaphysical standpoint, the same standpoint that ultimately vitiated the
metaphysical realist's attempt to explain reference. In the meantime,
however, I examine how pragmatic notions of use and user are variously







































Logical studies of argument and fallacy have historically flourished
at the expense of their rhetorical counterparts. An attempt to reverse this
trend was first intiated in 1952 whenChaim Perelman and Lucie
Olbrechts-Tyteca published their seminal work entitled Rhetorique et
philosophie pour une theorie de l'argumentation en philosophie. The
achievement of this study was the rediscovery of 'a part of Aristotelian
logic that had been long forgotten or, at any rate, ignored and despised.
It was the part dealing with dialectical reasoning, as distinguished from
demonstrative reasoning - called by Aristotle analytics - which is
analysed at length in the Rhetoric, Topics, and On Sophistical
Refutations' (Perelman, 1979, p. 9). This 'new rhetoric', as it was
called, brought with it an emphasis on previously neglected audience-
relative notions in the study of argument, notions like audience
adherence: 'It [argumentation] aims at obtaining or reinforcing the
adherence of the audience to some thesis, assent to which is hoped for'
(Perelman, 1979, p. 10). Such audience-relative notions continue to be
definitive of a rhetorical analysis of argument and fallacy. 4 Given that an
audience consists in a collection of users of argument, it is clear that user
relative-notions are central to the rhetorical approach.
Notions of use or function are most evident in the approach of
pragma-dialectics to the study of argument and fallacy. Prominent among
this approach is the work of Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst
who have been influenced to a large extent by Searle's (1969) speech act
theory. That theory extends language meaning beyond that based on
propositional content to include the functions (speech acts) that utterances
perform. Each speech act carries a set of felicity conditions 'that jointly
constitute the meaning of such acts and that are required for their
appropriate performance' (Jacobs, 1989, p. 346). This same conception
of felicity conditions pervades van Eemeren and Grootendorst's model of
argument and fallacy analysis, a model in which 'The principles
authorizing the distribution of the verbal moves over the consecutive
stages [of argumentative discourse] are accounted for in a set of rules for
the performance of speech acts' (1995, p. 135). Moreover, 'Taken
together, these rules constitute a theoretical definition of a critical
discussion' (p. 135). It is only within the context of a critical discussion,
van Eemeren and Grootendorst argue, that any determination concerning







































285), "an argument might be accepted by its audience but contain
tricks or cheats" (Walton, 1993, pp. 307-308).
71
Often a rejection of user-relative notions is what underlies a further,
seemingly unrelated rejection. Such is the case when Kahane rejects any
role for psychology in a philosophical analysis of fallacious reasoning. At
the root of this rejection is Kahane's unwillingness to attribute any
philosophical significance to the user-relative notion of acceptance:
Well, then, do we overstep the bounds of logic and philosophy when
we theorize about fallacious reasoning. Not, it seems to me, when we
attempt to specify what fallacious reasoning consists in, nor when we
specify the logical factors which make fallacious reasoning fallacious.
These are questions of methodology, and thus of logic and philosophy.
But we do overstep when we attempt to specify psychological
mechanisms that lead to fallacious reasoning, and when we devise
psychological categories useful in avoiding fallacious reasoning. The
attempt to avoid bad reasoning requires a bringing together of
philosophical and factual information, just as does every application of
philosophy to real life. So the question "What makes arguments
fallacious" is philosophical; the question "What leads us to accept bad
arguments" is not (1980, p. 38; emphasis added).
Not infrequently, psychology and user- (audience-) relative notions like
acceptance undergo simultaneous rejection. This is unremarkable in one
respect given that it is to psychology that we look for an account of
audience adherence or acceptance:
All of these difficulties seem to suggest strongly that Sanford's
insistence on the audience-relativity of the "begging the question"
criticism as well as his psychologizing of the notion are steps in the
wrong direction. The essential thing to see, I think, is that begging the
question has to do not with causal or temporal relations among our
beliefs, but with the relative epistemic status of the propositions we
assert (Biro, 1977, p. 263).
Clearly, there is considerable reluctance on the part of fallacy theorists
to include user-relative notions in a normative analysis of the fallacies.
I will contend in the next section that at the heart of this reluctance lies






















































fallacy" as an unacceptable shifting of burden of proof from Mr X to Mr
Y in a context of dialogue:
... Mr Y may maintain that no relevant evidence sufficient to favour
either acceptance or rejection is available. In this case it may be quite
unreasonable, even fallacious, for X to insist that Y produce evidence
for p's negation (p. 93).
It soon became apparent to fallacy theorists that many so-called fallacies
were non-fallacious or rationally acceptable within certain contexts of use.
For example, it had long been recognised that within a court of law, the
legal presumption of innocence is none other than a non-fallacious
argument from ignorance:
this mode of argument is not fallacious in a court of law, because there
the guiding principle is that a person is presumed innocent until proven
guilty (1961, p. 57; emphasis added).
the defense can legitimately claim that if the prosecution has not proved
guilt, this warrants a verdict of not guilty (1972, p. 77).
In more recent years, fallacy theorists have continued to assert the non-
fallaciousness of the argument from ignorance:
This ... argumentation scheme for the argumentum ad ignorantiam has
the following form:
It has not been established that all the true propositions in Dare
contained in K.
A is a special type of proposition such that if A were true, A would
normally or usually be expected to be in K.
A is in D.
A is not in K.
For all A in D, A is either true or false.
Therefore, it is plausible to presume that A is false (subject to further
investigations in D) (Walton, 1992, p. 386; emphasis added).
A clear pattern emerges from the above quotations - the argument from
ignorance is either viewed as fallacious in nature or, when it is
considered to be a non-fallacious mode of reasoning, it can only ground










































processes of rational thought. Scientific thinking, whilst representative of
rational thinking, is effectively subsumed by rational thinking. Indeed, it
is on account of this relationship of subsumption between scientific and
rational thought that the processes of scientific thought are both possible
and intelligible. Now, a complete scientific theory is a theory which
cannot be reformulated on the basis of any processes of scientific thought
which are within our present-day scientific knowledge. However, while
we make necessary use of processes of scientific thought in developing
complete scientific theories, any assessment of the completeness of a
scientific theory is an assessment which can only proceed when processes
of rational thought that are of a different order to the processes that are
involved in the establishment of a scientific theory are presupposed by
that theory. My point is quite simply that in posing scientific questions
and in developing complete scientific theories, the scientist is not posing
questions and developing complete theories about rational thought; rather,
the scientist's theories and questions presuppose rational thought.
Now consider the case of the philosopher in pursuit of inquiry. The
philosopher believes, mistakenly I contend, that he can pose questions
about, and develop complete theories of, rational thought in much the
same manner that the scientist poses questions about, and develops
complete theories of, physical phenomena. However, what the
philosopher fails to appreciate when he poses such questions and develops
such theories is that when those questions and theories involve rational
thought itself, then the rational framework which is presupposed by
scientific methodology and which confers sense upon the questions and
theories of the scientist is lacking in the case of philosophical
methodology. The nature of the particular questions and theories that the
philosopher is concerned to investigate requires that he deny the rational
presuppositions of scientific inquiry - while the scientist can claim
completeness for his analyses, analyses which at the same time
presuppose rational thought, the philosopher, who is theorising about
rational thought itself, can only claim completeness for his analyses by
denying that these analyses presuppose rational thought. The
philosopher's entire theoretical pursuit is the unintelligible one of
attempting to theorise about rational thought from a metaphysical
standpoint which is itself devoid of rational thought.
This same standpoint, I want to claim, is occupied by the fallacy





































4. Rejecting User-Relative Notions in Fallacy Evaluation: The Role of
Metaphysical Theorising
The recent history of fallacy inquiry, I have argued, has been one of
rejection of user-relative notions in the normative evaluation of the
fallacies. In this way, I claimed above that notions like assent and
acceptance are routinely rejected by fallacy theorists as are rhetorical and
dialectical frameworks of which these notions are a central part. What
motivates this rejection can now be directly examined. The fallacy
theorist, I contend, is engaged in a process of metaphysical theorising as
he sets about the task of fallacy evaluation. In the previous section, I
demonstrated how this theorising proceeded from within the perspective
of a metaphysical standpoint, a standpoint that caused the fallacy theorist
to view the knowledge base of the argument from ignorance as essentially
incomplete. The incompleteness of this knowledge base derived from the
metaphysical inflation of the concept of completeness - from within a
metaphysical standpoint it seemed that we could step outside of our
conceptual schemes and survey knowledge in its totality, against which
the knowledge that could be attained from within our rational procedures
seemed to be incomplete. In the same way, I now want to argue that a
metaphysical standpoint underlies the fallacy theorist's rejection of the
user-relative notions of assent and acceptance. An essential presupposition
of both of these notions is the existence of a mind that is endowed with
rational concepts - the notions of assent and acceptance that are at issue
in this context contain an inherent demand to justify an accepted thesis.
It seems to the fallacy theorist that this mind confers a vitiating
subjectivity on all the rational procedures and notions that are dependent
upon it. Moreover, it seems that this subjectivity can only be avoided by
transcending the mind and its concepts - it is this transcendence alone
that permits us to pursue an objective evaluation of the fallacies. One
manifestation of this pursuit of objectivity is the attempt by the fallacy
theorist to characterise the fallaciousness of an argument in terms of
concepts that are argument-relative. Thus, we find fallacy theorists like
Biro above rejecting rhetorical and dialectical treatments of question-
begging criticism - these treatments overlook 'the possibility and
necessity of regarding begging-the-question criticism as an objective
matter', an objective matter that is captured, according to Biro, by the










































grounding his/her belief cannot be communicated to another who can
implement them in order to describe the mystic's reality - the mystic's
methods, the scientist argues, are entirely within his/her experience. In
short, where mysticism emphasises the subjectivity of experience, science,
the scientist claims, emphasises the objectivity of the public domain.
Central to a scientific conception of objectivity, it was argued above,
is the rejection of private experience with all its inherent subjectivity. The
philosopher or fallacy theorist who wishes to develop a conception of
objectivity for use in his own analyses sets about a similar rejection of
experience. However, as the philosopher pursues this rejection, the whole
notion of a mind, within which these experiences occur, comes to be
rejected. But then there is nothing to distinguish the philosopher's
viewpoint from the type of metaphysical standpoint that I described
earlier. For this viewpoint, like a metaphysical standpoint, is essentially
devoid of the processes of rational thought. Fisher comments as follows
on just such a 'negation of "mind'" in the case of symbolic logic:
While positivism was busy denying metaphysics as a legitimate
philosophical study and conceiving of value statements as meaningless,
mathematical (symbolic) logic was moving toward a negation of
"mind". Following a line of thought stretching from Aristotle through
the works of Gottfried Leibniz, George Boole, and Gottlob Frege,
Bertrand Russell asserted in 1905:
Throughout logic and mathematics, the existence of the human
mind or any other mind is totally irrelevant; mental processes are
studied by means of logic, but the subject-matter of logic does not
presuppose mental processes and would be equally true if there
were no mental processes. It is true that in that case we should
not know logic; but our knowledge must not be confounded with
the truths which we know (1987, pp. 6-7).
In the same way that the logician believes he can confer objectivity on
logic by making any assessment of the correctness of axioms and the
validity of rules of inference a matter of the form of these structures",
thus eliminating any role for the subjective judgements of individual
minds in these assessments, the fallacy theorist believes that in order to
pursue objective evaluations of the fallacies, he must effectively assume
the perspective of a metaphysical standpoint, a standpoint from which any











































In this paper, I have examined a type of metaphysical standpoint that
underlies, I claim, the fallacy theorist's evaluation of the fallacies. This
standpoint, I have argued, effects a metaphysical inflation of the criteria
that we employ in a normative assessment of the fallacies. Against these
inflated criteria even reasonable forms of argument can appear to be
fallacious. I demonstrated how a metaphysically inflated concept of
completeness caused us to view the knowledge base of the argument from
ignorance as essentially incomplete and to evaluate as fallacious any
argument that was based on such a knowledge base. Similarly, a
metaphysical inflation of the notion of objectivity caused us to view
acceptance by users as a weak, essentially subjective standard of
evaluation and to judge any argument that satisfies this standard as
fallacious. I have argued that this metaphysical inflation of standards in
the evaluation of the fallacies results in the unintelligibility of those
standards - an argument from ignorance that satisfies a metaphysical
conception of completeness is not a form of rationally acceptable
argument so much as it is a form of unintelligible argument. We cannot
so much as make sense of an argument from ignorance that contains a
metaphysically complete knowledge base for the reason that such a
knowledge base is itself only possible from within a metaphysical
standpoint, the key feature of which is its lack of rational concepts. This
same unintelligibility was argued by van Fraassen to characterise the
attempt to explain reference. Moreover, van Fraassen argued that within
a pragmatic conception of language which emphasised the roles of user
and use the very appearance of their being a problem of reference that
required explanation quite simply dissolved. I have argued that a
pragmatic conception of argument in which there is a similar emphasis on
user and use precludes our assumption of a metaphysical standpoint and,
in the final analysis, our adoption of unintelligible, metaphysical













































presumed innocent until proven guilty? Thus, writes Copi, "[tjhe defense
can legitimately claim that if the prosecution has not proved guilt, this
warrants a verdict of not guilty." There is no fallacy here, however,
according to our analysis of ad ignorantiam, for it is no fallacy to presume
a statement is false, unless presumption is meant to imply knowledge of the
falsity or disconfirmation of the statement. The legal requirement is not that
innocence be confirmed or known, but only presumed' (pp. 94-95).
7. Biro's location of begging-the-question criticism in the argument-relative
notion of knowability mirrors the logician's attempt to locate the correctness
of axioms and the validity of rules of inference in the form of an argument.
8. I have in mind here Perelman's notion of a universal audience: 'This
objectivity will not consist either in conformity to some exterior object or
in submission to the commands of any particular authority. It envisages an
ideal of universality and constitutes an attempt to formulate norms and
values such as could be proposed to every reasonable being' (1980, p. 70).
Of course, for Perelman a universal audience constitutes an ideal as opposed
to something that is actually realised. Nevertheless, my point still holds -
acceptance of a thesis by all reasonable minds is the defining criterion of
the notion of objectivity.
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